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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
in Syracuse. The Cleveland address was that of the principal
office of the defendant, however, and was given as the defendant's
address on the application filed with the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles for this reason. The state of incorporation was also
included on the application, but this information was not trans-
mitted to the plaintiff. The court, by a 4-3 vote, reversed the
finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the Appellate
Division, that, under the circumstances, service under Section 52
was not improper.
The majority found that the defendant was in no way to
blame for the plaintiff's mistaken belief since the defendant's
statements to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles were correct and
the state of incorporation was included in the application. It
was no fault of the defendant, they maintained, that the latter
information was not communicated to the plaintiff.
Judge Dye, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the de-
fendant was, for purposes of service of process, a resident of
Ohio. Such a concept of a non-resident domiciliary has. long
standing recognition in the courts." The dissent also suggests
that the service may have been proper on a theory of estoppel
analogous to the finding of misrepresentation in cases involving
the use of license plates registered in the name of another.'7
The only difference between the manner of service used in
this case and that which would have been unquestionably allow-
able ,seems to be that the plaintiff mailed the summons to the
Secretary of State, whereas personal service on that officer is
the method required.'8 The desirability of maintaining strict
compliance with the prescribed methods of service was, however,
apparently deemed to outweigh any equitable considerations in
favor of the plaintiff.
Joinder of Parties
When a stockholder brings a derivative action he sues, not in
his own right, but in the right of the corporation.19 Generally
the stockholder must join the corporation in such a suit.20 It
has been held, however, that when a derivative action involves
16, Haggart v. Moran, 5 N. Y. 422 (1851); Uslan v. Woronoff, 173 Misc. 693,
18 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (City Ct. of New Rochelle), af'd 259 App. Div. 1093, 21 N. Y. S. 2d
613 (2d De't 1940).
17. See infra p. 53.
18. Compare VEHICLE AND T .vFic LAw § 52 with C. P. A. § 228, STOCK COR-
PoRATroN LAW § 25.
19. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947).
20. Greaves v. Gouge, 64 N. Y. 154 (1877) ; 13 FLETcHER, CO ORPATIONS § 5997
(Rev. ed. 1943).
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a defunct corporation, such corporation is not an indispensible
party.21 In Carruthers v. Jack Waite Mining Co.,22 the Court of
Appeals refused to extend this exception to the case where the
corporation involved, although extant, is entirely under the
management of another corporation.
In the instant case a stockholder of an Arizona corporation
brought a derivative action in the New York Supreme Court by
service on the officers of the managing corporation, which had
its principal offices in this state. The Court of Appeals held
that the Arizona corporation was an indispensible party. In
most cases a non-participant who would ordinarily be a plaintiff
would seem to be a conditionally necessary,28 rather than an in-
dispensible party, when he is not subject to service under C.P.A.
§ 194.24 The peculiar nature of a corporation in a derivative
action, however, as the source of the stockholder,-s rights required
the result in this case.
A further complication caused the court to reverse a dis-
missal of the complaint by the Appellate Division. The Court of
Appeals ruled that, although the Arizona corporation was an
indispensible party, and although it was impossible to serve that
corporation in New York, a dismissal was not consonant with
the procedural requirements of this state. The court referred
to section 192 of the Civil Practice Act which provides: "No
action shall be defeated by the non-joinder . . . of parties ex-
cept as provided in section one hundred ninety-three." C.P.A.
§ 193 requires that the court first order the joinder of an indis-
pensible party, and dismiss only if such party is not joined with-
in a reasonable time. A motion to add parties under Rule 102
of the Rules of Civil Practice was deemed by the court to be an
essential preliminary to a motion to dismiss. Conceding that
the motion to join the corporation in this case would be a futile
procedure, the court felt, nevertheless, that it could not con-
trovert the clearly enunciated policy of the Legislature.
Third-Party Practice
A covenant to repair by a lessor does. not of itself impose
liability on the lessor for damages resulting to third-parties from
his failure to make the repairs.2 Such liability to third-parties
21. Cohen v. Dana, 287 N. Y. 405, 40 N. E. 2d 227 (1942).
22. 306 N. Y. 136, 116 N. E. 2d 286 (1953).
23. Eg. Keene v. Chambers, 271 N. Y. 326, 3 N. E. 2d 443 (1936).
24. § 194 ". . . If the consent of any one who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained he may be made a defendant . .."
25. See Twelfth Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, 188 (1946).
26. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931).
